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redetermination with respect to Kersting-related interest
deductions as set forth in the Court's opinion in the test cases.
Because it is now evident that the decisions entered in the
Thompson cases are not based upon the Court's opinion in the test
cases, we conclude that the Thompson cases do not provide a basis
for entry of decision in petitioners' cases.
Petitioners assert that the language in the piggyback
agreements referring to the Court's opinion in the test cases is
merely a "secondary formula" for arriving at a decision in their
cases and that the controlling language is set forth in paragraph
3 of the 1986 piggyback agreement, which states: "A decision
shall be submitted in this case when the decision in the TRIED
CASE becomes final under I.R.C. sec. 7481". Petitioners'
argument is summarized in the following excerpt:
Wording in the standard form Stipulation in these
cases refers to making adjustments in Petitioner's
cases as described in an Opinion in the Tried Cases.
This wording appears to have been a secondary formula
for extending a Decision. It appears to provide the
basis for clarifying any ambiguity about how to extend.
It is submitted as a matter of contract construction
there is no ambiguity in this case which could be aided
by reference to any opinion. That opinion has become
irrelevant.
Furthermore, the Dixon et al. Opinion has been
vacated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A
remand has been made for the purpose of fact finding
and recommending whether or not that Opinion should be
reinstated. It is predictable that any Decision of
this Court, (one way or the other), will be appealed
back to the Ninth Circuit panel so a final Decision
herein is far away. There is no Opinion in the Tried
Cases and probably won't be one for a period of years.
The wording in the standard form Stipulation should be
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