- 15 - discarded not only as not applicable for a lack of ambiguity but, also, because the Opinion has been vacated. These Petitioner(s) want out of the hunt. They assert that their Stipulation is time-sensitive and now is the time to assert it. * * * There is no ambiguity about [paragraph 3 of the 1986 stipulation] * * *. Thompson 1979 has become final and it fairly represents the net favorable settlement. Although petitioners recognize that paragraph 3 provides the timing for entry of decision in the piggyback cases, they mistakenly conclude that the final decision in the Thompson case provides the substantive basis for computations for entry of decision in their cases. To the contrary, as indicated above, the piggyback agreements clearly state that the Court's opinion in the test cases will provide the substantive basis for computations for entry of decision in the piggyback cases. Under the circumstances presented, paragraph 3 of the 1986 piggyback agreement requires entry of decision in the piggyback cases once final decisions are obtained in the test cases that currently are on remand to the Court by virtue of the Court of Appeals’ opinion and mandate in DuFresne v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1994). To this point, we have limited our discussion to paragraph 3 of the 1986 piggyback agreement. However, petitioners' reliance on paragraph 3 of the 1986 piggyback agreement highlights the one material difference between the 1985 piggyback agreement and the 1986 piggyback agreement. Unlike the 1986 piggyback agreement,Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
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