- 15 -
discarded not only as not applicable for a lack of
ambiguity but, also, because the Opinion has been
vacated.
These Petitioner(s) want out of the hunt. They
assert that their Stipulation is time-sensitive and now
is the time to assert it. * * * There is no ambiguity
about [paragraph 3 of the 1986 stipulation] * * *.
Thompson 1979 has become final and it fairly represents
the net favorable settlement.
Although petitioners recognize that paragraph 3 provides the
timing for entry of decision in the piggyback cases, they
mistakenly conclude that the final decision in the Thompson case
provides the substantive basis for computations for entry of
decision in their cases. To the contrary, as indicated above,
the piggyback agreements clearly state that the Court's opinion
in the test cases will provide the substantive basis for
computations for entry of decision in the piggyback cases. Under
the circumstances presented, paragraph 3 of the 1986 piggyback
agreement requires entry of decision in the piggyback cases once
final decisions are obtained in the test cases that currently are
on remand to the Court by virtue of the Court of Appeals’ opinion
and mandate in DuFresne v. Commissioner, 26 F.3d 105 (9th Cir.
1994).
To this point, we have limited our discussion to paragraph 3
of the 1986 piggyback agreement. However, petitioners' reliance
on paragraph 3 of the 1986 piggyback agreement highlights the one
material difference between the 1985 piggyback agreement and the
1986 piggyback agreement. Unlike the 1986 piggyback agreement,
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011