Hospital Corporation of America and Subsidiaries - Page 85

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          the Court to disavow Scott Paper Co. v. Commissioner, supra, and            
          its progeny, and instead to follow the reasoning of A.C. Monk &             
          Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 1058, 1065-1066 (4th Cir. 1982)              
          (no justification for allocating portions of a single electrical            
          system; components of electrical system are structural components           
          if they can be reasonably adapted to general uses), or of                   
          Illinois Cereal Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 789 F.2d at 1244               
          (electrical distribution system was "other tangible property"               
          under section 48(a)(1)(B)).46                                               

          46    Absent a stipulation to the contrary, the instant case is             
          appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and                
          therefore is not controlled by the decisions of the Courts of               
          Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (A.C. Monk & Co. v. United States,           
          686 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1982)) or Seventh Circuit (Illinois                 
          Cereal Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 789 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir.                 
          1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-469).  See Golsen v. Commissioner,             
          54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).  The               
          Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not decided the issue;           
          accordingly, we decide the instant case as we think proper.                 
          Lardas v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 490, 498 (1992).                            
               We note, however, that  in Morrison, Inc. v. Commissioner,             
          891 F.2d 857, 863 n.* (11th Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for            
          the Eleventh Circuit stated as follows:                                     
               *We note that only Scott Paper is directly on point.  In               
               Scott Paper, the Tax Court analyzed a primary electrical               
               system to determine whether it partially qualified as                  
               tangible personal property under section 48(a)(1)(A).  The             
               Illinois Cereal and the Monk courts, however, discussed                
               whether portions of primary electrical systems constituted             
               other tangible personal property under section 48(a)(1)(B).            
               Although the Illinois Cereal court stated at the end of its            
               opinion that the taxpayer's primary electrical system did              
               not constitute tangible personal property, the court did not           
               squarely face the issue.  See Illinois Cereal, 789 F.2d at             
               1239 ("[Taxpayer] does not contend that its electrical                 
               distribution system is 'tangible personal property' under              
                                                             (continued...)           




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