- 64 -
704.04[2][a], at 704-10-704-11 (2d ed. 1997); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 701, 702; Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 194,
197-198 (5th Cir. 1996), affg. 105 T.C. 16 (1995); Berry v. City
of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353-1354 (6th Cir. 1994); Molecular
Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 919 (6th Cir. 1991);
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 365-368 (4th Cir.
1986).43
We conclude that Mr. Wilgus' report states legal conclusions
applying law to facts and that those legal conclusion are not
helpful to the Court. Consequently, we disregard them.44
Additionally, in support of their respective positions, the
parties presented expert testimony at trial and in reports
concerning the nature of the disputed property items. Expert
testimony may be in the form of an opinion or in the expression
of a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles
relevant to the case, which the finder of fact may apply to the
facts. Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory comm. note, 28 U.S.C. App. at
8871 (1994). Opinion testimony of an expert not supported by an
adequate foundation of relevant facts, data, or opinions,
however, is inadmissible conjecture or speculation. See Randolph
43 See also Estate of Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1993-97.
44 See also Shoney's S., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-
413 n.2, wherein we also disregarded legal conclusions contained
in a report prepared by Mr. Wilgus.
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