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refers to receiving income from racketeering activity, the
conspiracy statute uses only the word 'conspire'. See 18 U.S.C.
1962 and 371. Conspiring to commit an offense is not the
equivalent of engaging in a business activity."
The Government places too much emphasis on the forfeiture
and seizure provisions. The forfeiture provisions were
discussed in Accardo because the risk of forfeiture was integral
to the taxpayer's claim of a deduction under section 212(2). Id.
at 447. Those provisions have no bearing here, since
petitioner's claim for deduction is pursuant to section 162(a).
Moreover, the statute itself is not determinative of petitioner's
business activity. Rather, the indictment chronicles a business
transaction undertaken by petitioner as a member of the Chicago
organized crime family. Petitioner's involvement in this
business was confirmed by his criminal conviction.
Although it would seem contrary to public policy to allow a
deduction in the conduct of an illegal and highly reprehensible
criminal activity, it has been established that such is not
sufficient to deny a deduction otherwise allowable. See
Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 691-695; Commissioner v.
Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 27-29 (1958); Brizell v. Commissioner, 93
T.C. 151, 166 (1989); O'Malley v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 352, 362-
366 (1988). True, the payment of expenses in such activity may
not be deductible where the expense itself is illegal, see secs.
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