Thomas H. Nelson and Donna J. Zullo Nelson - Page 4

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          court noted that the payments designated as alimony in the                  
          divorce decree were actually part of the division of marital                
          property.  Petitioner appealed the divorce court's order to the             
          appropriate appellate court.  The appellate court held that the             
          divorce court no longer had jurisdiction in the matter and in an            
          opinion filed February 19, 1991, affirmed the divorce court's               
          order denying the relief petitioner requested.  The appellate               
          court likewise viewed the alimony payments to be part of the                
          division of marital property, stating in its opinion:                       
                    Although it is possible that the monthly payments                 
               in question were used by * * * [Mary Kay Nelson] for                   
               support, the foregoing evidence clearly shows that the                 
               payments were part of the distribution of the marital                  
               assets.  Under these circumstances, the fact that * * *                
               [Mary Kay Nelson] had remarried and had a new job would                
               not affect her right to the payments.  See, Zimmie v.                  
               Zimmie (1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d 94.                                      
          Elsewhere in its opinion, the appellate court pointed out that              
          under Ohio law the use of the term "alimony" in the divorce                 
          decree did not conclusively establish the purpose for which the             
          payments were made, stating:                                                
                    Historically, under Ohio law, alimony has been                    
               said to consist of two separate elements: periodic                     
               payments for sustenance and support, and the                           
               distribution of the marital assets.  Cherry v. Cherry                  
               (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 352.  As this court noted                  
               in Peck v. Peck (June 2, 1989), Ashtabula App. No. 88-                 
               A-1385, unreported, the distinction between the two                    
               types can often be difficult to discern.  However,                     
               certain rules have been provided for making this                       
                         Generally, the underlying purpose for                        
                    the periodic payment is the factor which                          

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