- 4 - court noted that the payments designated as alimony in the divorce decree were actually part of the division of marital property. Petitioner appealed the divorce court's order to the appropriate appellate court. The appellate court held that the divorce court no longer had jurisdiction in the matter and in an opinion filed February 19, 1991, affirmed the divorce court's order denying the relief petitioner requested. The appellate court likewise viewed the alimony payments to be part of the division of marital property, stating in its opinion: Although it is possible that the monthly payments in question were used by * * * [Mary Kay Nelson] for support, the foregoing evidence clearly shows that the payments were part of the distribution of the marital assets. Under these circumstances, the fact that * * * [Mary Kay Nelson] had remarried and had a new job would not affect her right to the payments. See, Zimmie v. Zimmie (1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d 94. Elsewhere in its opinion, the appellate court pointed out that under Ohio law the use of the term "alimony" in the divorce decree did not conclusively establish the purpose for which the payments were made, stating: Historically, under Ohio law, alimony has been said to consist of two separate elements: periodic payments for sustenance and support, and the distribution of the marital assets. Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 352. As this court noted in Peck v. Peck (June 2, 1989), Ashtabula App. No. 88- A-1385, unreported, the distinction between the two types can often be difficult to discern. However, certain rules have been provided for making this determination: Generally, the underlying purpose for the periodic payment is the factor whichPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next
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