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court noted that the payments designated as alimony in the
divorce decree were actually part of the division of marital
property. Petitioner appealed the divorce court's order to the
appropriate appellate court. The appellate court held that the
divorce court no longer had jurisdiction in the matter and in an
opinion filed February 19, 1991, affirmed the divorce court's
order denying the relief petitioner requested. The appellate
court likewise viewed the alimony payments to be part of the
division of marital property, stating in its opinion:
Although it is possible that the monthly payments
in question were used by * * * [Mary Kay Nelson] for
support, the foregoing evidence clearly shows that the
payments were part of the distribution of the marital
assets. Under these circumstances, the fact that * * *
[Mary Kay Nelson] had remarried and had a new job would
not affect her right to the payments. See, Zimmie v.
Zimmie (1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d 94.
Elsewhere in its opinion, the appellate court pointed out that
under Ohio law the use of the term "alimony" in the divorce
decree did not conclusively establish the purpose for which the
payments were made, stating:
Historically, under Ohio law, alimony has been
said to consist of two separate elements: periodic
payments for sustenance and support, and the
distribution of the marital assets. Cherry v. Cherry
(1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 352. As this court noted
in Peck v. Peck (June 2, 1989), Ashtabula App. No. 88-
A-1385, unreported, the distinction between the two
types can often be difficult to discern. However,
certain rules have been provided for making this
determination:
Generally, the underlying purpose for
the periodic payment is the factor which
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