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Petitioners, however, do not agree that the alimony
provisions contained in the divorce decree were part and parcel
of the division of marital property between petitioner and his
former spouse. They further argue that even if so, because the
payments fit within the definition of alimony for Federal income
tax purposes, the intended purpose for the payments is of no
consequence. For the following reasons, we agree with
petitioners' second argument.
Respondent invites us to distinguish between a payment made
as part of a division of marital property and one made for
spousal support. As noted in the portions of the appellate
court's opinion reproduced above, that distinction "can often be
difficult to discern". Under prior law we would have been
compelled to do so. However, under section 71(b) the distinction
need not be made. In an attempt to avoid the exact type of
dispute involved here, the Congress, mindful that the term
"alimony" is used and interpreted differently from State to
State, amended a prior version of section 71 in order to provide
a uniform and objective definition of the term for Federal income
tax purposes. For a discussion on this point, see Cunningham v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474.
Neither the June 11, 1989, order of the divorce court, nor
the opinion of the appellate court affirming that order changed
or modified the divorce decree. Consequently, the dispute
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