- 7 - Petitioners, however, do not agree that the alimony provisions contained in the divorce decree were part and parcel of the division of marital property between petitioner and his former spouse. They further argue that even if so, because the payments fit within the definition of alimony for Federal income tax purposes, the intended purpose for the payments is of no consequence. For the following reasons, we agree with petitioners' second argument. Respondent invites us to distinguish between a payment made as part of a division of marital property and one made for spousal support. As noted in the portions of the appellate court's opinion reproduced above, that distinction "can often be difficult to discern". Under prior law we would have been compelled to do so. However, under section 71(b) the distinction need not be made. In an attempt to avoid the exact type of dispute involved here, the Congress, mindful that the term "alimony" is used and interpreted differently from State to State, amended a prior version of section 71 in order to provide a uniform and objective definition of the term for Federal income tax purposes. For a discussion on this point, see Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-474. Neither the June 11, 1989, order of the divorce court, nor the opinion of the appellate court affirming that order changed or modified the divorce decree. Consequently, the disputePage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next
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