- 8 -
7.215(E). The original divorce decree as modified by opinion
rendered by the court of appeals limiting alimony to a term of 8
years is an order sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
section 71(b)(1)(A). The court of appeals remanded the matter to
the trial court for a specific "modification of the divorce
judgment". It was not a revocation of the divorce judgment. We
find therefore, that an order for payment was in existence during
the taxable years in issue and meets the requirements of section
71(b)(1)(A).
Frances Ryan also argues that Gregory Ryan's payments fail
the fourth requirement of section 71(b)(1), which provides that
the alimony obligation must terminate upon the payee's death.
Section 71(b)(1)(D), however, does not require that the
termination upon death provision be in writing in the divorce
instrument; alimony may terminate as a matter of State law upon
death of the payee spouse. See Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1994-474.
Under Michigan State law, in the absence of a written
provision in the judgment of divorce to the contrary, alimony
terminates upon the death of the payee spouse. Couzens v.
Couzens, 364 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). Thus, by reason
of the express language in the divorce decree and as a matter of
State law, it is clear that payments ordered in the Judgment of
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011