- 35 -
With the foregoing in mind, we must decide whether peti-
tioners and the Family Trusts separately and independently
invested in the limited partnerships or whether petitioners, in
substance, acquired partnership interests B in their entirety,
retaining term interests, and transferring the remainders to the
Family Trusts. On the basis of the record before us, we conclude
that petitioners acquired the full partnership interests out-
right, and that the rationale of Lomas Santa Fe, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 693 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Georgia
R.R. & Banking Co., 348 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1965), applies to deny
petitioners their amortization deductions of term interests in
the CGF and Lincoln Partnerships.
As mentioned earlier in this opinion, Gordon v. Commis-
sioner, supra at 326-327, and Kornfeld v. Commissioner, 137 F.3d
1231 (10th Cir. 1998), highlight the manner in which we are to
dispose of the instant cases; i.e., by examining closely the
transactions in question in order to ascertain whether they were
really prearranged steps of a single transaction, cast from the
outset to achieve an ultimate result.15 This examination is
intensely factual.
15This formulation of the step transaction doctrine
describes the "end result" test, one of three alternative tests
used for determining when and how to apply this doctrine in a
given situation. For a summary of the step transaction doctrine
and its three approaches, see our discussion in Penrod v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428-1430 (1987). Both Kornfeld v.
Commissioner, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1996-472, and Gordon v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 309, 324
(1985), respectively, apply this test to step together the series
of related transactions at issue in those cases.
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