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properties within the meaning of section 1031(a). Respondent
contends, however, that Mr. Canty's residence does not qualify as
like-kind property within the meaning of section 1031(a).8
Respondent also disputes that the four properties acquired by OIP
were identified within the time prescribed by section
1031(a)(3)(A). Although respondent acknowledges that "Petition-
ers did attempt to structure their July 26, 1990 sales of real
property to take the form of a Section 1031 like-kind exchange",
respondent maintains that "the substance of those transactions
shows that they do not qualify for Section 1031 treatment."
Respondent also argues that the cases relied on by petitioners
involving multiparty transactions are distinguishable from the
present case in that the record in the present case "does not
show any single, integrated plan at the time of the July 26,
1990" disposition by OIP of lots 11 and 12 and OIP's 25-percent
interests in lots 14 and 15. Moreover, according to respondent,
Unlike the situations in Garcia, Barker, and
Haden, petitioners here had effective control over the
sales proceeds. The sales proceeds were subject to the
control of Canty's longtime friend and attorney,
Heffernan [sic]. * * * Heffernan [sic] wrote checks to
8According to respondent,
petitioners' [sic] attempt to stretch Section 1031 to
cover the "purchase" of Canty's home. The property
petitioners sold were commercial real estate lots.
* * * Canty continued to live in the home after the
purchase, and did not pay rent to petitioners. * * *
This transaction appears to be more of another draw to
Canty than an acquisition of real estate for investment
purposes.
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