- 33 - With respect to Mr. Canty's testimony on which petitioners are relying, as we stated above, we have reservations about his credibility. Moreover, Mr. Canty's testimony that he notified Mr. Kaplan prior to July 26, 1990, of the identity of the proper- ties that OIP intended to acquire with the escrowed sales pro- ceeds is belied by the escrow agreement itself. That agreement recited that as of July 26, 1990, OIP was "in the process of identifying a parcel or parcels of real property to be acquired". In addition, the escrow agreement did not identify any particular property to be purchased thereunder and did not identify what portion of the escrowed sales proceeds would be used to purchase such property and what portion would remain as boot under section 1031. Furthermore, although the escrow agreement required OIP to identify within 45 days after July 26, 1990, any property that it wanted Interstate to acquire pursuant to the escrow agreement by notifying Interstate in writing of the identity of any such property, OIP did not comply with that requirement. We are not required to, and we shall not, rely on Mr. Canty's uncorroborated testimony that, prior to July 26, 1990, he informed Mr. Kaplan of the identity of the properties to be received by OIP in exchange for lots 11 and 12 and OIP's 25-percent interests in lots 14 and 15, which testimony serves the interests of petitioners. See Lerch v. Commissioner, supra; Geiger v. Commissioner, supra; Tokarski v. Commissioner, supra.Page: Previous 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011