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With respect to the parties' stipulation on which petition-
ers are relying, we find that stipulation to be vague, general,
and inconclusive in establishing that OIP complied with section
1031(a)(3)(A). That stipulation merely shows that Mr. Kaplan
believes that at approximately the time of the sales by OIP of
the real estate interests in question, and probably within 45
days thereafter, Mr. Canty made Mr. Kaplan generally aware of
properties that he was interested in purchasing including, but
not limited to, the properties that were ultimately purchased
with a portion of the escrow fund. In this connection, it is
noteworthy that Mr. Canty, who negotiated all real estate trans-
actions on behalf of the various petitioners involved in real
estate investment, testified that, as a negotiating tactic, he
sometimes intentionally stalled the closing of real property on
which a real estate contract had been signed in order to attempt
to lower the purchase price. As far as Mr. Canty was concerned,
his negotiations on real estate transactions on behalf of OIP and
other petitioners were not final until a real estate deal was
actually closed.
Third, on the record before us, we find that petitioners
have failed to show that OIP, acting through its president Mr.
Canty, did not have control over the escrowed sales proceeds.
See Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 409 (1969) ("The statute
[section 1031] only requires that as the end result of an agree-
ment, property be received as consideration for property trans-
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