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property held by a person within a State is a matter of State
law.” Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 297, 300 (1998)
(citing Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 355-357 (1945)). The
issue in this case is a factual one. The parties frame the
question as being whether petitioner has proven that Ms. Scott
satisfied the factual requirements of a resulting trust.3 If so,
a resulting trust arose in her favor, and only one-half the value
of the Glenview house is includable in the taxable estate.
A resulting trust arises when one person furnishes
consideration for property and title is taken in the name of
another person. See Fowley v. Braden, 122 N.E.2d 559, 563 (Ill.
1954). A resulting trust does not depend on contract or
agreement but arises by operation of law to enforce the presumed
intent of the person who furnishes consideration for the
property. See Prassa v. Corcoran, 181 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Ill.
3 We are aware that the Supreme Court of Illinois has, under
certain circumstances, refused to enforce equitable property
rights between unmarried cohabitants on grounds of public policy.
See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). We are also
aware that the Illinois Appellate Court has interpreted Hewitt
to permit the enforcement of equitable property rights between
unmarried cohabitants in some circumstances. See Spafford v.
Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). But see Ayala v.
Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). However, in the
instant case, respondent has not raised the issue of whether a
resulting trust should be disallowed under Illinois law on
grounds of public policy. Because petitioner had no occasion to
present pertinent evidence or argument on this question, we do
not consider it and address only the question of whether the
factual requirements for a resulting trust have been satisfied.
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