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doubt on whether both parties considered Ms. Scott a co-owner of
the Glenview house.
Finally, the claim filed by Ms. Scott with the Probate
Division of the Illinois Circuit Court states that Ms. Scott was
to pay Ms. Horstmeier $25,000 for one-half of the downpayment on
the Glenview house, at a rate of $3,000 per year starting in
1976, but that Ms. Horstmeier “made a gift in the amount of
$3,000” for each year that payment was required. This
representation to the probate court is in apparent conflict with
Ms. Scott’s testimony in this case, which was that she provided
services in exchange for her half of the downpayment. In our
view, this confusion regarding the downpayment is damaging to
petitioner’s case, given that the standard of proof for a
resulting trust is “clear, convincing and unmistakable.” In re
Estate of Wilson, 410 N.E.2d at 27.
Considering all the facts and circumstances, we do not
believe that petitioner has shown that a resulting trust arose
under Illinois law, which requires clear and convincing evidence
to support such a finding. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that a resulting trust does not arise where the
“evidence is doubtful or capable of reasonable explanation upon
any theory other than the existence of a trust”. Kohlhaas v.
Smith, 97 N.E.2d at 776. The infirmities in petitioner’s theory
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