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the underpayment resulting from fraud, but only that some part of
the underpayment is attributable thereto. See Otsuki v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 105 (1969).
Fraud is generally defined as intentional wrongdoing on the
part of the taxpayer, with the specific purpose of evading tax
believed to be owed. See Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56 (9th
Cir. 1958); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir.
1941), revg. and remanding 40 B.T.A. 424 (1939). Negligence of a
taxpayer, whether slight or gross, is not sufficient to prove
fraud. See Mitchell v. Commissioner, supra at 310. To prove
fraud, the Commissioner must show that the taxpayer intended to
evade taxes believed to be owing by conduct intended to conceal,
mislead, or otherwise prevent the collection of taxes. See Parks
v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 661 (1990).
The presence of fraud is a question of fact to be resolved
upon consideration of the entire record. See Recklitis v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 909 (1988). Because direct proof of
the taxpayer's intent is rarely available, fraud may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S.
492 (1943); Recklitis v. Commissioner, supra at 910. Courts have
developed a nonexclusive list of the types of circumstantial
evidence--often referred to as "badges of fraud"--that will
support a finding of fraudulent intent.
In Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir.
1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1984-601, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit--to which an appeal of this case would lie--set
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