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Petitioner, by emphasizing what actually happened
(especially in the 1997-98 timeframe), sought to show that it was
unlikely that the property would be approved for development as
residential property within the city of Pleasanton. We cannot,
however, attribute to a 1993 or 1994 buyer or seller these
unforeseen facts that occurred several years later--in this
instance, 3 to 4 years later. Nor can we allow such facts to
bear on value unless those facts could be foreseen, known, and
would have influenced a willing buyer and seller. See United
States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973). For purposes of this
case, the statute mandates a date-of-death fair market valuation.
See sec. 2031(a). The determination of value is to be made as of
the valuation date (i.e., date of death), and knowledge of
unforeseeable future events that may have affected the value
cannot be attributed to the hypothetical buyer or seller. See
sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs.
We find the 1994 agreement to be sufficiently
contemporaneous to represent a benchmark value for the subject
property, and it comports with comparable sales. As of
decedent’s death, it was likely that the Busch property would be
sold for and/or developed as residential property. The 1994
agreement represents the usual type agreement entered into by
Ponderosa and other developers. In that regard, both of
petitioner’s experts (DeVoe and Hulberg) used comparable sales
that comport in price per acre with the price in the June 1994
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