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We did so, in part, on the basis that, if Mr. Sterquell’s
testimony were false, then it was petitioner’s task to impeach
Mr. Sterquell. We found that petitioner had an adequate
opportunity to impeach Mr. Sterquell, by cross-examination or
otherwise. We concluded our order denying the motion to strike
by rejecting petitioner’s broad claim of misconduct by
respondent. Petitioner has failed to show any misconduct by
respondent in connection with the testimony of Mr. Sterquell.
Petitioner’s complaints with respect to respondent’s alleged
discovery abuses or conduct during the hearing fail to establish
any ground on which to base any sanction of respondent in this
case. Indeed, it is appropriate to repeat here the remark we
made in the course of the trial on the merits in this case, which
followed the hearing. In our order dated January 7, 2000, we
stated:
Petitioners also make various claims concerning
“stonewalling” by respondent. Petitioners have made
similar claims throughout this litigation, since the
appearance of petitioners’ present counsel. In our
order of December 9, 1999, we rejected petitioners’
characterization of respondent’s behavior in this case
as “stonewalling”. Indeed, we stated: “It is
petitioners who have repeatedly asked, both formally
and informally, for continuances.” Again, we reject
petitioners’ characterization of respondent’s behavior
as stonewalling. Indeed, petitioners’ claim of
respondent’s tardy response, discussed above, seems to
us to have such little merit that we caution
petitioners’ counsel to be aware of section 6673(a)(2)
(“Counsel’s liability for excessive costs.”).
XIII. Conclusion
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