- 52 -
We have rejected every ground set forth by petitioner in
support of the motion. We do not find that respondent’s actions
during the course of his examination of the 1986 partnership
return or during the course of this case prejudiced petitioner in
presenting his case. With respect to respondent’s examination of
the 1986 partnership return, respondent issued the FPAA within
the statutory period. We have set forth in detail the major
procedural steps of this case from the petition to the motion.
The initial delay was on respondent’s motion, but the petitioning
partners were also the authors of motions to continue or motions
that otherwise delayed the proceedings. There have been numerous
participating partners during the intervening 10 years, and
petitioner waited until May 1999 to ask for leave to intervene.11
Blame (if any) for the time it took to proceed to the present
posture cannot be laid only at the feet of respondent.
Petitioner also claims that the delay will cost him
additional interest, which we should abate. In Dixon v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-101, the Court denied time-
sensitive additions to tax for negligence under sections
6653(a)(2) and 6653(a)(1)(B) and increased interest under section
11 Petitioner says that he could not participate in this
proceeding during the time he was under criminal investigation.
The grand jury investigating petitioner concluded by Mar. 1,
1993. In his motion to intervene, petitioner claims that,
thereafter, he believed that the interests of the partners was
being adequately represented by counsel for the petitioning and
participating partners.
Page: Previous 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011