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In our opinion, the parenthetical refers to specific kinds of
content, not any content placed on machine-readable media, as
petitioner maintains. When section 993(c)(2)(B) was enacted in
1971, no one could foresee the future media on which films and sound
recordings might be distributed. Because of this unknown, Congress
included the phrase “similar reproductions” in the parenthetical.
“Reproduction” is an exact copy of particular preexisting
content fixed on a medium. Blank tapes are not reproductions of each
other (but are manufactured). Copyright concerns content, not
media. Indeed, a copyright is defined as “A property right in an
original work of authorship (such as a literary, musical, artistic,
photographic, or film work) fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, giving the holder the exclusive right to reproduce,
adapt, distribute, perform, and display the work.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 337 (7th ed. 1999); see 17 U.S.C. sec. 102(a) (1988).
Clearly, petitioner does more than distribute blank tapes;
petitioner’s products are sold because of the content on the medium.
Were we to accept petitioner’s broad interpretation that
“similar reproductions” covers all content on machine-readable
media, then revenues from the sale or lease of copyrights in
practically all products (existing and yet to be invented) would
qualify for FSC benefits.
The only copyrights Congress affirmatively identified as
qualifying for export property treatment were copyrights in motion
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