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The mere fact that sound or video recordings can be digitally
represented does not transform them into computer software.
Computer software is fundamentally different from motion
pictures and sound recordings. Within the purview of the
parenthetical, (1) “films, tapes, and records” are content specific,
and (2) “similar reproductions” refers to “films, tapes, and
records” on media that might be invented in the future. In sum, we
hold that copyrights in computer software do not constitute section
927(a) “export property”. Support for this holding is found in the
temporary regulation to which we now turn our attention.
2. Interpretation of the Temporary Regulation
Generally, temporary regulations have binding effect and are
entitled to the same weight as final regulations. See UnionBanCal
Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 309, 316 (1999); Peterson Marital
Trust v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 790, 797 (1994), affd. 78 F.3d 795
(2d Cir. 1996). We interpret temporary regulations in toto rather
than phrase by phrase. See Norfolk Energy, Inc. v. Hodel, 898 F.2d
1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1990).
The temporary regulation comports with the language of the
statute. It succinctly states that, although copyrights do not
constitute export property, copyrighted articles, such as computer
software, do qualify as long as the article is not accompanied by a
right to reproduce outside the United States. Permitting a right
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