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reputation (i.e., difficulty in finding a comparable position). See
Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1108 (1983). Without a doubt,
here a link between petitioner’s firing and his personal injury
exists. See sec. 104(a)(2); Commissioner v. Schleier, supra at 330.
The Massachusetts law upon which petitioner’s causes of action were
based allows recovery for personal injury and intangible harms
petitioner suffered. See Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,
355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
As previously stated, despite the language in the agreement
which states that the entire $750,000 is for personal injury, we do
not believe that the entire amount payable to petitioner was on
account of personal injuries or sickness. Rather, we believe that
petitioner’s counsel placed such language in the agreement in an
attempt to have the moneys petitioner was to receive from Millipore
come within the purview of section 104(a). Millipore did not object
to such language because from Millipore’s viewpoint the language was
inconsequential.
In our opinion, the settlement represented (1) severance
compensation, (2) compensation for petitioner’s agreement not to
accept employment with a competitor of Millipore, and (3)
compensation for personal injuries or sickness suffered by
petitioner as a result of his firing.
Considering all the facts as revealed by the record, we
conclude that 45.6 percent of the overall $750,000 settlement
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