J.C. Shepherd - Page 22




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          stock were allocated to his and his sons’ capital accounts                  
          according to their respective partnership shares.  Under the                
          partnership agreement, each son was entitled to receive                     
          distribution of any part of his capital account with prior                  
          consent of the other partners (i.e., his father and brother), and           
          was entitled to sell his partnership interest after granting his            
          father and brother the first option to purchase his interest at             
          fair market value.  Upon dissolution of the partnership, each son           
          was entitled to receive payment of the balance in his capital               
          account.                                                                    
               In these circumstances, we conclude and hold that                      
          petitioner’s transfers to the partnership represent indirect                
          gifts to each of his sons, John and William, of undivided 25-               
          percent interests in the leased land and in the bank stock.11  In           
          reaching this conclusion, we have effectively aggregated                    
          petitioner’s two separate, same-day transfers to the partnership            
          of undivided 50-percent interests in the leased land to reflect             

               11 We do not suggest, and respondent has not argued, that              
          such an analysis necessarily entails disregarding the                       
          partnership.  Similarly, in Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d              
          1220 (5th Cir. 1982), and in the other cases cited supra treating           
          gifts to corporations as indirect gifts to the other                        
          shareholders, the courts did not necessarily disregard the donee            
          corporations.  In either case, characterizing the subject gift as           
          comprising proportional indirect gifts to the other partners or             
          shareholders, as the case may be, rather than as a single gift to           
          the entity of which the donor is part owner, reflects the                   
          exigency that the donor cannot make a gift to himself or herself.           
          See id. at 1224 (“Mrs. Kincaid cannot, of course, make a gift to            
          herself”).                                                                  





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