Zinovy Brodsky - Page 57




                                       - 142 -                                         
               In the notice for 1991 and 1992, respondent disallowed                  
          (1) for 1991 all of the claimed Schedule E expenses with respect             
          to the Church Street property and the Sanchez Street property and            
          (2) for 1992 all of the claimed Schedule E expenses with respect             
          to the Sanchez Street property.  Respondent made that determina-             
          tion because, inter alia,96                                                  
               it has not been established that * * * [the claimed                     
               Schedule E expenses] were ordinary and necessary busi-                  
               ness expenses or were expended for the purpose desig-                   
               nated. * * * nor has it been established that you were                  
               at risk per section 465 of the Internal Revenue Code.                   
               * * *                                                                   
          As an alternative ground for disallowing the claimed Schedule E              
          expenses for 1991 and 1992, respondent determined that                       
               the claimed losses are not allowable per Section 469 of                 
               the Internal Revenue Code because you did not actively                  
               participate in the management of the rental properties                  
               and because you have no other passive income to offset                  
               the passive losses.                                                     
               With respect to $1,611.10 of the claimed Schedule E expenses            




               96An additional ground set forth by respondent in the notice            
          for 1991 and 1992 for disallowing all of the claimed Schedule E              
          expenses for those years was that petitioner and Ms. Brodsky had             
          not established an ownership interest in the Church Street                   
          property and the Sanchez Street property.  On the record before              
          us, we reject that ground.  On that record, we have found that at            
          least during part of 1991 and 1992 until the date of the sale of             
          the Church Street property, petitioner owned an interest in that             
          property, although the extent of that interest is not disclosed              
          by credible evidence in the record.  We have further found on the            
          record before us that at least during the period beginning in                
          1991 and ending on the date of the sale of the Sanchez Street                
          property in 1993, petitioner and Ms. Brodsky owned an interest in            
          that property, although the extent of that interest is not                   
          disclosed by credible evidence in the record.                                





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