David J. Lychuk and Mary K. Lychuk, et al. - Page 62




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          principle that a capital expenditure may not be deducted from               
          current income.  It serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing             
          currently a deduction properly attributable, through                        
          amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset becomes             
          income producing.”  The thrust of these statements, in our minds,           
          is that an expenditure must be deducted in accordance with its              
          own individual identity, regardless of the possible recurrence in           
          the taxpayer’s business of that type of expense.  A taxpayer’s              
          income will be distorted if the taxpayer currently deducts a                
          recurring expense that should be capitalized and the amount of              
          that expense fluctuates meaningfully between taxable years.  For            
          example, when the amount of such an expenditure increases                   
          significantly from one year to the next, the deduction of the               
          expenditure may result in the taxpayer’s income being understated           
          in the first year and overstated in the second, and the profits             
          of the business may appear to be sinking, when in fact it is                
          enjoying great success, or rising, when in fact it may be                   
          seriously diminished.  See Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner,           
          56 T.C. 1324, 1332-1333 (1971), affd. without published opinion             
          496 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974).  Such an inaccurate reporting of              
          this fluctuation thwarts, rather than fosters, “a major objective           
          of efficient tax policy.”  Cabintaxi Corp. v. Commissioner, 63              
          F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1995), affg. in part, revg. in part, and            
          remanding on another issue T.C. Memo. 1994-316.                             






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