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disagreed with both of these findings. The Court of Appeals
focused primarily on the everyday meaning of the word “ordinary”
and, without any reference to Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79
(1938), and with only a passing reference to Commissioner v.
Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974), which the Court of Appeals
cited for the proposition that capitalization prevents the
distortion of income in the case of depreciable property,
concluded that the loan origination costs were ordinary business
expenses for purposes of section 162(a) because the costs were
normal and routine to the business of a bank. See PNC Bancorp,
Inc., v. Commissioner, 212 F.3d at 828-829, 834-835. The court
saw no meaningful distinction between PNC’s loan origination
costs and the costs incurred as "ordinary expenses" by banks in
general. The court stated that PNC’s deduction of the loan
origination costs would not distort its income because it
incurred those costs regularly. See id. at 834-835.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also stated that
PNC’s costs did not create any separate and distinct asset within
the meaning of Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Association,
403 U.S. 345 (1971). Unlike the assets in Lincoln Sav. & Loan
Association, which were not used by the taxpayer in its everyday
business, PNC used its loans as part of its everyday business.
The Court of Appeals distinguished the respective assets in the
cases by this fact. The Court of Appeals also distinguished
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