D. G. Smalley and Nell R. Smalley - Page 21





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          v. Kent Diversified Prods., Inc., 389 S.E.2d 261, 262-263 (Ga.              
          Ct. App. 1989).8                                                            


               8 Some Georgia case law arguably supports respondent’s                 
          contention that the property petitioner relinquished constituted            
          personalty.  In Johnson v. Truitt, 50 S.E. 135, 136 (Ga. 1905),             
          the contractual right of a purchaser to cut standing timber                 
          within 12 months was referred to as “merely a license to cut and            
          remove the timber for the purposes stated, during the time fixed            
          in the contract.”  See also Graham v. West, 55 S.E. 931 (Ga.                
          1906) (sale of standing timber where the growing trees are to               
          remain in the soil for a fixed time or indefinitely concerns an             
          interest in the land, but if the trees are to be immediately                
          severed and carried away, the sale is of personal property).  In            
          North Ga. Co. v. Bebee, 57 S.E. 873, 874 (Ga. 1907), the Georgia            
          Supreme Court cited Johnson v. Truitt, supra, with approval for             
          the proposition that “the owner of the land may convey a right to           
          cut and remove timber within a specified time, in which case the            
          absolute title to the timber described does not pass to the                 
          purchaser, but only a license to use it for the purpose stated,             
          during the period specified in the contract.”  To the same                  
          effect, see also Seabolt v. Christian, 60 S.E.2d 540, 543 (Ga.              
          Ct. App. 1950); Pope v. Barnett, 163 S.E. 517, 518 (Ga. Ct. App.            
          1932).                                                                      
                                                                                     
               In Camp v. Horton, 63 S.E. 351, 353 (Ga. 1909), the Georgia            
          Supreme Court reviewed other Georgia precedents to contrary                 
          effect and concluded that the above-quoted language from Johnson            
          v. Truitt, supra, was “not essential to the decision of the case            
          or the correctness of the judgment”.  See also Chavers v. Kent              
          Diversified Prods., Inc., 389 S.E.2d 261, 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)           
          (dicta in Johnson v. Truitt, supra, is not controlling).                    
               In short, on the issue of whether an agreement for the sale            
          of growing trees is a contract for the sale of an interest in               
          land, Georgia State law is less than a seamless web of                      
          jurisprudence.  In this regard, Georgia State law is not unique.            
          With regard to this legal issue, among the various States “There            
          is considerable difference of opinion, often in the same                    
          jurisdiction, * * * undoubtedly due to diverse theories of the              
          courts with respect to the exact nature of standing trees.”                 
          Davis, Annotation, Sale or Contract for Sale of Standing Timber             
          as Within Provisions of Statute of Frauds Respecting Sale or                
          Contract of Sale of Real Property, 7 A.L.R.2d 517, 518 (1949).              





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