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Even if we were to assume, however, for the sake of
argument, that the statute might benefit married donors as the
estate posits, such differential treatment would not violate
constitutional requirements of equal protection. In FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993), the Supreme
Court observed:
Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or
inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a
license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification. Where
there are “plausible reasons” for Congress’ action,
“our inquiry is at an end.” This standard of review is
a paradigm of judicial restraint. * * * [Citations
omitted.]
See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1983) (statutory classifications are generally valid “if they
bear a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose”);
Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 790, 808-811
(1994) (imposition of generation-skipping transfer tax does not
violate equal protection), affd. 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996).
The statutory provisions at issue here do not proceed along
suspect lines or infringe upon the right to make marital
decisions or any other fundamental constitutional right. Cf.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 386 (1978) (although the
right to marry is “of fundamental importance”, the State may
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