Electronic Arts, Inc. and Subsidiaries - Page 49




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               b.  EAPR Ineligible As a Matter of Law                                 
                                    i. WHTC Cases                                     
               Respondent contends that “Cases arising under section 921              
          and 922 [the Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation provisions] are           
          not applicable to a section 936 issue.  See Norfolk Southern                
          Corp. [v. Commissioner,] 104 T.C. [13] at 41 [(1995)].”                     
               Firstly, the cited opinion, Norfolk S. Corp. v.                        
          Commissioner, 104 T.C. 13, modified 104 T.C. 417 (1995), affd.              
          140 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 1998), neither states nor stands for the             
          proposition for which respondent cites it.  The cited opinion               
          does not even involve or cite sections 921, 922, or 936 or their            
          predecessors.11                                                             

               11Norfolk S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 13, modified              
          104 T.C. 417 (1995), affd. 140 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 1998), was an             
          investment credit case; it did not involve the WHTC provisions or           
          the possession tax credit provisions.  Respondent directs our               
          attention to Norfolk S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. at 41.              
          That page is part of our analysis of the taxpayer’s contention              
          that “used” in the phrase “used in the transportation of                    
          property” in sec. 48(a)(2)(B)(v), must be given the same meaning            
          as in the phrase “used in the trade or business” in sec.                    
          167(a)(1).  We concluded that, in the context of sec.                       
          48(a)(2)(B)(v), it made sense to give “used” a different meaning            
          from “used” in the context of sec. 167(a)(1).  We buttressed our            
          conclusion as follows, Norfolk S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.           
          at 40 n.30:                                                                 
               30 We note in further support of our rejection of                      
               petitioners’ interpretation of the container exception that            
               in sec. 48(a)(2)(B)(v) Congress employed the phrase “used in           
               the transportation of property”, not “used in the trade or             
               business of transporting property”.  “The use of different             
               phrases may reasonably be viewed as an indication of two               
               different meanings.”  Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel                      
                                                             (continued...)           





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