- 50 -
Secondly, respondent’s brief does not present to us, or
direct our attention to, an analysis to support the proposition
that WHTC opinions “are not applicable to a section 936 issue.”
Thirdly, as opinions of this and other courts have shown,
the histories of WHTC legislation and possessions corporation
legislation have been intertwined for the entire history of the
WHTC provisions. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 62
T.C. 728, 735-738 (1974), and opinions cited therein, affd.
without published opinion 517 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975) (a WHTC
“active conduct of a trade or business” case in which the 1921
Act predecessor of section 936 is described as having “laid the
conceptual groundwork,” for, among other provisions, the WHTC
provisions); Burke Concrete Accessories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 588, 596-599 (1971), and opinions cited therein (a
consolidated return case in which a section 1504(b)(4) reference
to section 931 is construed by taking into account the agreement
of the parties that the corporation there involved was both a
WHTC and a possessions corporation). This intertwining of
11(...continued)
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 128 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also LaCroix v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 471
(phrase “tangible personal property” interpreted for
purposes of sec. 179).
The same point, that differences in statutory terminology
ordinarily lead to the conclusion of differences in meaning, is
also made in Berry Petroleum Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 104
T.C. 584, 646 n.41 (1995), affd. without published opinion 142
F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1998). See supra note 9.
Page: Previous 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011