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recklessness, without more, would justify the imposition of
sanctions under section 6673(a)(2). See, e.g., Nis Family Trust
v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 523, 547 (2000); Dixon v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2000-116.
In the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
“bad faith” is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly
raises a frivolous argument. In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec.
Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996); Estate of Blas v.
Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986). This is consistent
with the notion that a member of the bar should be deemed to have
the ability to recognize a frivolous argument when he or she
encounters it. While we have some doubt that Ms. Spaid intended
to harass respondent, we have no doubt she knowingly and
recklessly made frivolous arguments in pretrial memoranda, at
trial, and in posttrial briefs.
All litigants, especially members of the bar who have
received training in law and professional responsibility, are
expected to read the cases cited for the Court, to assure that
those cases remain current, and to advance only those legal
arguments that are warranted by existing law, by nonfrivolous
argument for its extension, modification, or reversal, or by the
establishment of new law. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2);
Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The
purpose of sections 6673 and 6702, like the purpose of Rules 11
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