Edward A. Robinson III and Diana R. Robinson - Page 28




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          Circuit acknowledged that it was reasonable that income tax                  
          deficiencies should properly be considered allocable to their                
          business.  Id. at 939.  The court, however, applied Chevron and,             
          like the Eighth Circuit, relied on the Blue Book to conclude that            
          the 9T regulation was a permissible construction of the statute.             
          Id. at 939, 941.                                                             
               C.   Allen--Fourth Circuit                                              
               The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded              
          that section 163(h) was ambiguous.  Allen v. United States, 173              
          F.3d 533, 534 (4th Cir. 1999).  It based this conclusion on “the             
          absence of a statutory directive” as to the meaning of “properly             
          allocable” and the fact that there were “sharply divergent                   
          opinions” in Redlark.3  Id. at 536.  The court applied Chevron               
          and accorded the 9T regulation Chevron deference.  Id. at 537.               
          The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also relied on the               
          Blue Book to conclude that the 9T regulation was a permissible               
          construction of the statute.  Id. at 537-538.                                
               D.   McDonnell--Sixth Circuit                                           
               The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, without                
          analysis, simply relied on the analysis of the Court of Appeals              
          for the Ninth Circuit in Redlark.  McDonnell v. United States,               
          180 F.3d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 1999).                                           


               3  This suggests that every time a statute fails to define a            
          word or term, or any time judges disagree regarding the meaning              
          of a word or phrase in a statute, the statute is automatically               
          ambiguous.                                                                   




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