- 112 -
VASQUEZ, J., dissenting: The majority has failed to
convince me that we should not abide by our previous holding in
Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31 (1996), revd. and remanded
141 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 1998). I continue to agree that section
1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 52 Fed. Reg.
48409 (Dec. 22, 1987) (the 9T regulation), is invalid for the
reasons stated in the majority and concurring opinions in
Redlark. I write separately, however, to address the appropriate
standard of review applicable to the case at bar in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001), and the various Courts of Appeals’ opinions--
including the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuit opinions--addressing Mead.
I. Mead
In Mead, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the limits of
deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), owed to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it administers. The Court held that
an agency’s interpretation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference when (1) Congress delegated
authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of law,
and (2) the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority. United States v.
Mead Corp., supra at 226-227. Thus, the delegation of authority
by Congress to the agency is insufficient in and of itself to
Page: Previous 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011