- 102 -
petitioners’ business, under section 1.163-8T(c)(3)(ii),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra, some interest expense should
be treated as properly allocable to petitioners’ business and as
deductible under the statute.
As suggested in Judge Vasquez’s dissenting opinion, in
interpreting the statutory provisions in dispute herein, the
occasional deference mandated by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984), to
governmental agency interpretations of statutory language left
ambiguous by Congress is not applicable.
More recently, in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001), the Supreme Court addressed the general and flexible
standard to be used by courts in evaluating what deference, if
any, should be given to agency interpretative regulations and
rulings as follows:
The fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute has been understood to
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the
degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency’s position * * *. * * *
[Id. at 228; fn. refs. omitted.]
And further:
“The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment in
a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” [Id.
at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)).]
Page: Previous 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011