- 103 -
Consistent with the above statement quoting Skidmore, and
before concluding whether the particular agency rulings involved
therein (of the Environmental Protection Agency and of the U.S.
Customs Service, respectively) were entitled to Chevron type
deference, in both Chevron and Mead the Supreme Court reviewed
the very “detailed and reasoned” historical aspects of the E.P.A.
ruling (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
supra at 865), and the many “angles” of the classification ruling
procedures of the U.S. Customs Service (United States v. Mead
Corp., supra at 231).1
In the instant case, however, with regard to respondent’s
promulgation of section 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A), Temporary Income
Tax Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 48409 (Dec. 22, 1987), there is scant
indication of respondent’s deliberations and degree of care
exercised prior to promulgation of the temporary regulation. No
history of the development of the temporary regulation is
available. No hearing was held. No notice and comment were
provided. No proposed regulation was made available. No history
of respondent’s development of the policy position reflected in
the temporary regulation is available. It appears to me that the
statement in the 1987 Blue Book, discussed infra, and
respondent’s failed litigating position in years prior to 1986 as
1 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, part VI at 853-859 (1984); United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, part B at 231-234 (2001).
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