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In light of Mead, Chevron deference is reserved for only
those agency interpretations reached through notice-and-comment
or comparable formal administrative procedures. Ind. Family &
Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir.
2002); TeamBank, N.A. v. McClure, 279 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir.
2002); U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137,
1141 (7th Cir. 2001) (involving the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue), revg. 113 T.C. 329 (1999). While the Supreme Court
left open the possibility that Chevron deference may be
appropriate in instances similar to notice-and-comment rulemaking
or formal adjudication, it did not clearly outline these
instances.5 Matz v. Household Intl. Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265
F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001). Agency interpretations that are
not the result of such formal administrative procedures are
entitled to the lesser deference accorded under Skidmore. Ind.
Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Thompson, supra at 480; Teambank,
N.A. v. McClure, supra at 619 n.4; U.S. Freightways Corp. v.
Commissioner, supra at 1141.
Furthermore, in applying Mead, “mere ambiguity in a statute
is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority”, agency
authority is not to be lightly presumed, and courts should not
5 “Only when agencies act through ‘adjudication[,] notice-
and-comment rulemaking, or * * * some other [procedure]
indicat[ing] comparable congressional intent [whatever that
means]’ is Chevron deference applicable * * * .” United States
v. Mead Corp., supra at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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