- 23 -
1984, petitioner also acquired--with funds provided by Dr.
Barranco--over 100 acres. Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion on
brief, we do not believe that such items represented mere “normal
support”. On the basis of all the evidence, we conclude that
petitioner significantly benefited from the understatements in
tax. See Clevenger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-149 (holding
it was not inequitable to deny relief under former section
6013(e) where understatements improved a couple’s jointly owned
home, sole title to which the relief-seeking taxpayer received in
a divorce settlement), affd. 826 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir. 1987); see
also Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672, 681 (1989)
(requiring specific facts regarding lifestyle expenditures, asset
acquisitions, and dispositions of tax savings to prove no
significant benefit); Von Kalinowski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2001-21 (receiving $500,000 over 15 years was a significant
benefit); French v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-38 (rejecting
the taxpayer’s argument that $150,000 in certificates of deposit
sourced to understatement “merely amounted to normal support”
where the taxpayer could not account for how it was spent).
Moreover, since Dr. Barranco’s release from prison, he has
resided with petitioner in the Barrancos’ primary residence (of
14(...continued)
decide this hypothetical issue of Virginia law. Whatever Dr.
Barranco’s motives might have been in making the transfers, the
fact remains that he made them. Furthermore, petitioner clearly
benefited from these transfers, as illustrated by her subsequent
transfer of the properties to her children in 1996, in return for
their note to her in the principal sum of $617,400.
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