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Rule 33(b) provides:
(b) Effect of Signature: The signature of counsel
or a party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading[s]; that, to the best
of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. The signature of counsel also constitutes
a representation by counsel that counsel is authorized
to represent the party or parties on whose behalf the
pleading is filed. * * * If a pleading is signed in
violation of this Rule, the Court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, may impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, including reasonable counsel’s fees.
Petitioners’ counsel here did not cite at any time the law
applicable to the stipulated facts of this case. He failed even
to read the cases cited to him by the Court before he submitted
the case. In recent cases, counsel for a taxpayer has been
ordered to pay the fees and costs of respondent’s counsel
incurred in responding to frivolous arguments. See Takaba v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 296-305; Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-149. It seems particularly appropriate that counsel
should bear costs when his clients have been penalized. Cf.
Johnson v. Commissioner, 289 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2002), affg. 116
T.C. 111 (2001). In Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-
169, we explained:
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Last modified: May 25, 2011