Charles and Teresa Brodman - Page 13

                                       - 13 -                                         
               Rule 33(b) provides:                                                   
                    (b) Effect of Signature:  The signature of counsel                
               or a party constitutes a certificate by the signer that                
               the signer has read the pleading[s]; that, to the best                 
               of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief                     
               formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in                
               fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith                  
               argument for the extension, modification, or reversal                  
               of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any                 
               improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause                        
               unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of                  
               litigation.  The signature of counsel also constitutes                 
               a representation by counsel that counsel is authorized                 
               to represent the party or parties on whose behalf the                  
               pleading is filed. * * *  If a pleading is signed in                   
               violation of this Rule, the Court, upon motion or upon                 
               its own initiative, may impose upon the person who                     
               signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate                
               sanction, which may include an order to pay to the                     
               other party or parties the amount of the reasonable                    
               expenses incurred because of the filing of the                         
               pleading, including reasonable counsel’s fees.                         
               Petitioners’ counsel here did not cite at any time the law             
          applicable to the stipulated facts of this case.  He failed even            
          to read the cases cited to him by the Court before he submitted             
          the case.  In recent cases, counsel for a taxpayer has been                 
          ordered to pay the fees and costs of respondent’s counsel                   
          incurred in responding to frivolous arguments.  See Takaba v.               
          Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 296-305; Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C.            
          Memo. 2003-149.  It seems particularly appropriate that counsel             
          should bear costs when his clients have been penalized.  Cf.                
          Johnson v. Commissioner, 289 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2002), affg. 116            
          T.C. 111 (2001).  In Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-              
          169, we explained:                                                          






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