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intricately developed contract16 with specific provisions
tailored to the Plastics Recycling group of cases. Only the
execution of a piggyback agreement by both petitioner and
respondent could reflect the parties’ mutual assent to settle the
instant case based on the disposition of the lead case. See
Fisher v. Commissioner, supra, and Estate of Satin v.
Commissioner, supra, in which counsel for the taxpayers and
respondent signed the piggyback agreement. Neither petitioner’s
counsel (or counsel for the general partner) in this case nor
respondent’s counsel executed a piggyback agreement.
Petitioner’s contention that the protest letter approximates a
piggyback agreement is mistaken. At best, the protest letter
indicates an intention that petitioner might be willing to enter
into a formal piggyback agreement, but nothing in the record
indicates that petitioner followed up on any such intent.
The protest letter itself indicates an intention “to follow
the Tax Court’s decision in the lead cases” but omits any mention
of following a settlement of the lead cases, although that
possibility is specifically mentioned in paragraph 5 of the
piggyback agreement. Moreover, within a month after the Miller
settlement was executed, Becker as TMP, having become aware of
16 The protest letter itself indicates an intention “to
follow the Tax Court’s decision in the lead cases” but omits any
mention of following a settlement of the lead cases, although
that possibility is specifically mentioned in paragraph 5 of the
piggyback agreement.
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