- 16 -
They have a similar preclusive effect, and the policy reasons for
giving final and conclusive effect to a closing agreement and a
prior judgment of a court are also similar.12 Indeed, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hopkins v. United States (In
re Hopkins), 146 F.3d at 733 n.2, analogized the effect of a
closing agreement to res judicata. See also Katz v. United
States, 43 AFTR 2d 79-1124, 79-1 USTC par. 9332 (D. Mass. 1979).
Given the similarities in the purpose of a closing agreement
and the doctrine of res judicata, we cannot conclude any logical
reason to afford section 6015 relief in the case of a prior
judgment involving section 6013(e) and deny relief in the case of
a closing agreement entered into before the effective date of
section 6015. In both situations, the taxpayer-spouse did not
have an opportunity to raise a claim for relief under section
6015. We do not perceive Congress’s failure to include
specifically an exception with respect to closing agreements to
11(...continued)
could have been offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); Calcutt
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 14, 21 (1988). The doctrine applies to
judgments even where the Court’s final decision was based on an
agreement of the parties. Trent v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2002-285 (citing United States v. Bryant, 15 F.3d 756, 758 (8th
Cir. 1994)).
12The purpose of a closing agreement is to once and for all
terminate and dispose of tax controversies. States Steamship Co.
v. IRS, 683 F.2d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982). Similarly, the
doctrine of res judicata has the “dual purpose of protecting
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue and
of promoting judicial economy by preventing unnecessary or
redundant litigation.” Meier v. Commissioner, supra at 282.
Page: Previous 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011