- 9 -
Commissioner, supra at 819. Relevant factors in evaluating these
elements include the motive or purpose of the taxpayer in making
the expenditure, the effect of the purchased goods or services on
the condition, and the origin of the expense. Id.; Havey v.
Commissioner, supra at 412.
B. Contentions of the Parties
Respondent interprets the above authorities to preclude
deduction of any portion of the costs incurred in transporting
Mr. Alderman to and from work as personal commuting expenses
under section 262. Petitioners, in contrast, maintain that at
least some part of the costs associated with the intermediate
round trip made by Mrs. Alderman between the workplaces of the
two spouses constitutes a deductible medical expense under
section 213.3 They seek a deduction computed in accordance with
the standard mileage rate established by the Commissioner.
Petitioners’ argument is summarized on brief as follows:
3 Sec. 213 is the sole statutory basis argued by petitioners
on brief in support of the deductibility of the transportation
costs in dispute. To the extent that previous statements made or
documents submitted by petitioners raised an issue of
deductibility as a business expense under sec. 162, this issue is
deemed to have been abandoned or conceded. See, e.g., Rule
151(e)(4) and (5); Bradley v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 367, 370
(1993); Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 683 (1989); Rybak
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 n.19 (1988). In any event, the
shortcomings in substantiation discussed infra in text would
preclude deduction as sec. 162 expenses under the pertinent
strict substantiation rules of sec. 274 and accompanying
regulations. We further note that petitioners never raised any
argument pertaining to sec. 67(b)(6) and (d).
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