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further indicated that 90 miles per day was the portion for which
petitioners sought a deduction.
On brief, petitioners open by stating that all mileage
discussed therein is subject to an additional 5 miles depending
upon the route available and that the quoted figures are “the
lesser mileage.” They then proceed to describe the distance
between petitioners’ residence and Mr. Alderman’s employment in
Atmore as “some 40 miles” and between Mr. Alderman’s work and
that of Mrs. Alderman in Monroeville as “some 50 miles”. They
ask that 100 miles per day for the intermediate commute be
treated as a deductible expense.6
Difficulties inherent in this state of affairs include the
following. Statements made on brief are not evidence and cannot
form the basis for this Court’s determination. Rule 143(b);
Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 214 n.7 (1992).
Furthermore, the “some” language used by petitioners on brief,
not to mention the round numbers, indicates that these figures
are themselves only estimates. More importantly, the numbers
used in petitioners’ brief do not take into account or compensate
for the two 7-mile portions, discussed at trial, that would be
necessitated by Mrs. Alderman’s own commute. At the same time,
6 We note that petitioners failed to use a consistent
numbering scheme in identifying and discussing the various
segments of their commute within their opening brief and between
their opening and reply briefs. Where appropriate, we have used
context to take into account any resultant discrepancies.
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