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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that “the
costs of operating an automobile to and from work cannot be
contained in the statutory definition of ‘medical care’”. Id. at
413. As explained by the Court of Appeals, an indirect medical
benefit did not make a personal expense deductible because the
statute was limited to those expenses “primarily incurred for
medical care.” Id. This Court’s decision below had likewise
reasoned that the taxpayer’s costs were, “in essence, nothing
more than commuter’s expenses which are personal in nature” and
thus failed to qualify under the statute, as follows:
[The taxpayer] argues that braces and crutches are
deductible as medical expenses and therefore the costs
of his special automobile should also be deductible
because he uses the latter as a substitute for the
former. The petitioner’s argument, however, ignores
the fact that his automobile expenses, unlike the
expense of braces and crutches, do not represent
expenses incurred primarily for the alleviation of a
physical defect or illness, which is a requirement for
deductibility * * * [Donnelly v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.
at 1279-1280.]
This Court applied similar logic in Buck v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 113 (1966), and Goldaper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1977-
343. The taxpayer in Buck v. Commissioner, supra at 116, was
subject to epileptic seizures and advised by his physician not to
drive. He hired a chauffeur to transport him to work. Id. The
Court held that the employment of the chauffeur “to drive
petitioner to and from his places of business was a matter of
petitioner’s own personal choice, comfort, and convenience and
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