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the options would probably have resulted in greater expense to
petitioners, while some might have reduced petitioners’ outlay.
Merely because petitioners’ chosen arrangement enables them to
specifically identify an “extra” commute made to accommodate
Mr. Alderman’s disability should not render their alleged “above
normal” costs any more legitimate for section 213 purposes than
those necessitated by other alternatives.
Regardless of the transportation method selected, the
primary and fundamental underlying purpose for the costs incurred
in petitioners’ situation was to get Mr. Alderman to and from
work, not to treat his medical condition. The cases are
unanimous in holding that such costs are personal, nondeductible,
commuting expenses. Stated otherwise, the costs of
transportation to and from work are not directly and proximately
related to medical care where employment is not prescribed as
therapy and thus do not satisfy the “but for” test applied under
section 213.
Petitioners’ circumstances illustrate this shortcoming. As
previously indicated, the “but for” test requires that (1) the
expenditures were an essential element of the treatment for the
condition, and (2) the expenditures would not have otherwise been
incurred for nonmedical reasons. Jacobs v. Commissioner, 62
T.C. at 819. Working, though admirable, was not an essential
part of Mr. Alderman’s prescribed treatment, and there has been
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