- 20 -
Consequently, while we cannot rely on petitioners’
statements on brief as evidence in this proceeding, the
inconsistencies between and among the remarks therein and the
testimony and exhibits offered at trial, which are evidence, call
into question the accuracy and reliability of the pertinent
evidentiary material. No documentary evidence supporting either
the mileage figures or the workdays has ever been submitted. On
this record of apparent estimates, unexplained inconsistencies,
and silence on relevant facts, any further estimate by the Court
would lack a reasonable foundation. Hence, we are unable to form
a rational basis upon which to apply even the applicable standard
mileage rate.8
A further difficulty with permitting petitioners to claim a
medical expense deduction for the costs of transporting
Mr. Alderman to work is that the record fails to establish that
7(...continued)
testimony and exhibits introduced at trial. We nonetheless have
been unable rationally to explain the discrepancies. For
instance, even considering the difference between a calendar year
and a typical school year does not appear to account for the 94-
day period cited by petitioners. The exhibits introduced by
petitioners showing Mr. Alderman’s attendance at professional
development events date from August of 1999 through February of
2001, and thus would seem to indicate employment during both the
1999-2000 and the 2000-2001 school years.
8 We note that, pursuant to Rev. Proc. 99-38, 1999-2 C.B.
525, the standard mileage rate for computing deductible medical
expenses for the year 2000 was 10 cents per mile. Petitioners,
inconsistent with their substantive argument, use 32.5 cents per
mile, the rate specified in the revenue procedure for business
expense deductions, in certain calculations.
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