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The primary dispute between the parties is whether
P’s family support payments satisfy sec. 71(b)(1)(D),
which provides that a cash payment meeting the
requirements of sec. 71(b)(1)(A)-(C) is alimony only if
(1) there is no liability to make any such payment for
any period after the death of the payee spouse
(“continuing payment” liability) and (2) there is no
liability to make any payment (in cash or property) as
a substitute for such payments after the death of the
payee spouse (“substitute payment” liability).
Held: P had no continuing payment liability, as
contemplated in sec. 71(b)(1)(D), with respect to the
family support payments at issue.
Held, further, a payor spouse’s general State law
obligation to continue supporting his or her children
in the event of the payee spouse’s death does not, in
and of itself, give rise to a substitute payment
liability, as contemplated in sec. 71(b)(1)(D), with
respect to an unallocated support obligation such as
California family support.
Held, further, P had no substitute payment
liability, as contemplated in sec. 71(b)(1)(D), with
respect to the family support payments at issue.
Held, further, P is entitled to an alimony
deduction for 1999 in the amount of $49,808, consisting
of the 12 monthly payments of $3,832 ($45,984) and the
additional $3,824 payment attributable to his
arrearage; P is not entitled to any alimony deduction
for 1999 in respect of his payments to the court-
appointed psychologists.
Held, further, P is liable for the addition to tax
under sec. 6651(a)(1), I.R.C., for failure to file
timely his 1999 return.
Gary M. Erickson, for petitioner.
James J. Posedel, for respondent.
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