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Petitioner’s third ground for continuance is that he was set
to be released on March 17, 2005, and would be better able to
prepare for trial after his release. While petitioner was set to
be released from incarceration on March 17, 2005, he was to be
immediately deported. Petitioner’s counsel represented that,
upon order of this Court, petitioner would be allowed back into
the country for 60 days to prepare for and attend trial.
However, they offered no proof of this assertion. Additionally,
there is nothing to indicate that petitioner would come back to
the United States to prepare for or attend trial. Petitioner has
repeatedly filed motions for continuance within approximately 2
weeks of trial and has apparently failed to take any steps in
preparation for trial since his first attorney withdrew.
Considering the history of this case, we doubt petitioner would
be more likely to prepare for trial after deportation. We find
that petitioner’s release from incarceration, given his immediate
deportation, does not justify granting petitioner’s motion.
The Court has wide discretion to consider the prejudice to
all parties to a case when ruling on a motion for continuance.
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (trial court granted
broad discretion on matters of continuance); Schaefer v.
Commissioner, supra; Harris v. Commissioner, supra. Any
prejudice to petitioner was the result of his own delay in
preparation for trial and his procrastination in hiring counsel
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