Estate of Lorraine C. Disbrow, Deceased, Martha D. Johnson, Executrix - Page 3

                                         -3-                                          
                                  FINDINGS OF FACT2                                   
          1.  Preface                                                                 
               Some facts were stipulated.  We incorporate herein by this             
          reference the parties’ stipulation of facts and the exhibits                
          submitted therewith.  We find the stipulated facts accordingly.             
          Martha Johnson is the executrix of decedent’s estate.  Martha               
          Johnson resided in Hampstead, New Hampshire, when the petition in           
          this case was filed.                                                        
          2.  Decedent and Her Family                                                 
               Decedent was born on January 14, 1922, and she died at                 
          7:22 a.m. on February 9, 2000, at the age of 78.  She was a U.S.            
          citizen and a resident of the State of New York.  She died                  


               2 During trial, petitioner elicited testimony from two                 
          partners of the partnership and the attorney who recommended and            
          implemented the transaction in issue.  We have evaluated the                
          testimony of each of these witnesses by observing his or her                
          candor, sincerity, and demeanor and by assigning weight to the              
          elicited testimony for the primary purpose of finding disputed              
          facts.  See Neonatology Associates, P.A. v. Commissioner, 115               
          T.C. 43, 84 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002).  Our                 
          perception of these witnesses while viewing them testifying at              
          trial, coupled with our review of the record and our finding that           
          each of these witnesses has a pecuniary interest in the outcome             
          of this case, leads us to discount much of their uncorroborated             
          testimony as unreliable.  We are not required to, and we do not,            
          rely on that discounted testimony to support petitioner’s                   
          positions herein.  See, e.g., Brookfield Wire Co. v.                        
          Commissioner, 667 F.2d 551, 552 (1st Cir. 1981), affg. T.C. Memo.           
          1980-321; Haffner’s Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.              
          Memo. 2002-38, affd. 326 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).  See also Kenney           
          v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-431, where the Court declined to           
          rely upon most of the testimony of the taxpayer and a long list             
          of relatives and close friends who testified in support of her              
          claim for innocent spouse relief.                                           





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