- 50 -
LARO, J., dissenting: The Court’s opinion concludes supra
p. 29 that respondent’s interpretation of section 1433(b)(2)(A)
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), Pub. L. 99-514, 100
Stat. 2731, “is a reasonable and valid interpretation of the
plain language of TRA 1986 section 1433(b)(2)(A)”. Because I
disagree, I dissent.1 As the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits held in Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812
(8th Cir. 1999), and Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078 (9th
Cir. 2002), factual settings that the Court’s opinion supra pp.
15 and 17 acknowledges are “nearly identical” to the factual
setting at hand, the plain reading of TRA 1986 section
1433(b)(2)(A) leads to a conclusion contrary to that expressed in
the Court’s opinion. The conclusion in the Court’s opinion is
1 Following a prior judicial decision rejecting respondent’s
interpretation of TRA 1986 sec. 1433(b)(2)(A) as inconsistent
with the plain reading of that section, respondent caused his
interpretation to be prescribed in sec. 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i), GST
Tax Regs. The Court’s opinion supra p. 21 frames this case as “a
question of first impression concerning the validity of section
26.2601-1(b)(1)(i), GST Tax Regs.” I view this case differently.
In a case such as this, where the question involves an
“interpretation of the plain language” of a statute, respondent’s
interpretation of that language is not entitled to any greater
respect simply because respondent has bootstrapped his
interpretation by causing it to be prescribed in a regulation.
The judiciary, and not respondent (or the Secretary), is the
final authority on the plain meaning of a statute. See Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC,
390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S.
374, 385 (1965). While Natl. Cable & Telecomm. Association v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), allows an agency in
certain cases to overrule an adverse judicial interpretation
through the issuance of regulations, that case is inapplicable
where, as here, the judicial interpretation follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute.
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