- 54 -
387 (6th Cir. 1949) (holding that plain and unambiguous text must
be applied as written without resort to construction); see also
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-843 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress”).
The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held
in Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999), and
Bachler v. United States, 281 F.3d 1078 (2002), that the general
rule in TRA 1986 section 1433(b)(2)(A) may be applied plainly as
written, and the Court’s opinion sets forth no persuasive reason
as to why the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, or any
other Court of Appeals for that matter, should (or will) disagree
with the holdings of those cases.4
The Court’s opinion strains to find an ambiguity in the
clear reading of TRA 1986 section 1433(b)(2)(A) by referencing
4 The Court’s opinion suggests supra p. 25 that the Courts
of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits did not consider the
general rule in its “particular context”. I disagree. Those
courts applied the general rule according to the plain reading of
its terms and, consistent with settled law, see, e.g., Bower v.
Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that an ambiguity in one part of a statute is not cause to narrow
or expand the plain meaning of a term found elsewhere in the
statute), declined respondent’s invitation to narrow the plain
reading of those terms on account of a proffered ambiguity in the
terms of the statute. When a clear term may be construed plainly
as written, a court should not strain to find ambiguity in that
term so as apply it differently. See Sphinx Intl., Inc. v. Natl.
Union Fire Ins. Co., 412 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005).
Page: Previous 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011