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is binding on the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary
or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute. Id. at 227.
II. Mead
It is “plain error for [courts] to rely on” Chevron in
determining what deference to give agency actions without
considering Mead. Am. Fedn. of Govt. Employees, AFL-CIO v.
Veneman, 284 F.3d 125, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
In Mead, the Supreme Court clarified the limits of Chevron
deference owed to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it
administers. The Supreme Court held that an agency’s
interpretation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for
Chevron deference when (1) Congress delegated authority to the
agency to make rules or regulations carrying the force of law,
and (2) the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority. United States v.
Mead Corp., supra at 226-227, 237; Pool Co. v. Cooper, 274 F.3d
173, 177 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, “mere ambiguity in a
statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of
authority”, agency authority is not to be lightly presumed, and
courts should not presume a delegation of power based solely on
the fact that there was not an express withholding of such power.
Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1082 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
When an agency’s interpretation of a particular statutory
provision does not qualify for Chevron deference, it is entitled
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